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Abstract
Increasing consumption of energy in the consumer market along with “low” levels of
investment in energy conservation technology has raised considerable concern among public
policy analysts. Many believe that the high reported consumer discount rates along with low
audit participation rates by many segments of the population reflect consumer ignorance rather
than true structural parameters, which has led to substantial expenditures on policies designed to
educate consumers. In this paper, we explore the “uninformed consumer hypothesis” by relating
the decision to invest in energy saving insulation to one’s level of education, presuming this
should be correlated with an individual’s probability of being well informed, along with a
number of variables that help proxy for the economic returns to home improvement, and the
discount rates that individuals apply to them. Although a cursory examination of our data
confirms previous results, tests performed on a more formalized model show that the economic
variables are found to be important determinants of home improvement behavior, but the
education variables are not.2
I. Introduction
Recent concern over the United States economy’s increasing consumption of natural
resources and the concomitant environmental damage has generated a significant amount of
public policy debate. Many experts have proposed policies designed to increase energy
conservation as a means to reduce consumption. Although an increase in energy efficiency could
theoretically lead to an increase in consumption, conservation has generally been viewed as a
means of reducing demand. The proposals to reduce energy consumption include research and
development (R&D) tax credits for conservation technology, investment tax credits for the
purchase of conservation products, and energy taxes to raise the cost of energy from the marginal
private cost to an estimate of the marginal social cost. The effectiveness of these types of
proposals has been debated at length by economists. Predictions range from severe negative
impacts on the economy from energy taxes to lackluster responses to tax credits for conservation
products to healthy economic stimulus for energy related R&D credits.
Another approach for increasing energy conservation, apparently endorsed by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) and many state agencies, is not related to tax cuts or tax credits at
all. Rather, it is to embrace what we will term here, the Uninformed Consumer Hypothesis
(UCH). This view argues that consumers are unaware of the potential high returns on investment
from purchasing energy-efficient household goods such as refrigerators, air conditioners, and
home insulation. If the UCH is valid, an appropriate government role in educating consumers
about these missed opportunities may exist. On the other hand, if the UCH is not valid, the
government may be wasting valuable tax dollars on ineffictive and unnecessary public-service
programs.
1 In addition, government agencies have, through regulation, tried to prevent
                                                       
1  The FY2000 budget proposal includes $72,644,000 for the Department of Energy’s
Energy Information Administration (EIA) which, “supports energy information activities which
are designed to provide timely, accurate and relevant energy information for use by the3
consumers from purchasing certain items based on their energy efficiency and also to require
buildings to meet certain energy efficiency standards. These regulations would only be
appropriate if consumers lack the knowledge themselves to make appropriate decisions.
In this paper, we explore the validity of the UCH.  We relate a household’s decision to
invest in energy saving devices to variables that we presume to be correlated with an individual’s
probability of being well informed, along with a number of variables that help proxy for the
economic returns to home improvement and an individual’s discount rates. Unlike previous
studies, we employ a large random sample of households, which ameliorates the problems
associated with relying on utility company data.
In the next section we review the literature regarding household energy conservation
behavior. In section III we develop the UCH and construct a model for testing it. Section IV
discusses the construction of the data set that we use and describes the variables that will be used
in our model. Section V presents stylized facts as well as our regression results from our analysis
and Section VI concludes.
II. Literature Review
The UCH appears to find its origins in two related literatures. Studies of utility programs,
e.g.,  Berry, Soderstrom and Hirst (1981), often find that most participants of energy audits are
young, college educated, and well-to-do and that poorer families are far less likely to participate.
In a logit analysis using data collected from households in Minnesota, Tonn and Berry (1984)
find that income and education are positively related to the decision to participate in an energy
audit. Berry and Brown (1988) address methods of increasing participation in conservation
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Administration, the Congress and the general public.” (Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 2000, pg. 405.4
programs by a particular segment of the population that “under-invests” in insulation, namely the
elderly.
All of these studies focused on utility programs, rather than retrofitting activity itself.
Wirtshafter (1985) analyzes six different audit programs offered by utility companies to try to
identify any possible biased representation of households taking advantage of these programs.
He finds that certain restrictions set forth by the utility companies in granting investment
incentives, such as low-interest or interest-free loans, preclude certain classes of households from
participating. For example, home ownership requirements prevent a greater proportion of low
income households than high income households from participating, as more low income
households rent instead of own their homes.
Another possible explanation of bias based on studies with voluntary audit participation
is a greater mistrust of utility companies by poor families. In addition, non-participation in utility
company sponsored audits by the poor or elderly does not necessarily imply non-participation in
conservation. It may simply be the case that an energy audit is not necessary to realize the
benefits of weather stripping doors and windows, caulking cracks or turning down the
thermostat. Finally, utility companies may be intentionally targeting households who consume
large amounts of energy; a group that is most likely wealthier than the average household.
Hirst, Goeltz and Carney (1981), looking at a dataset similar to the one we will use for
our analysis but for a single, earlier period (1977-1978), find households who took retrofit action
to insulate their house earned on average $2000 more a year. The head of the household also
averaged two years younger, was more likely to own their own home, had higher fuel bills and
was more likely to live in a single family home. Furthermore, just over half of those surveyed did
not undertake any retrofit activity in this period. Hirst et al. (1982) concludes that this dataset
suggests that, “programmes are needed to encourage non-retrofitters to adopt conservation5
measures... programmes are [also] needed to encourage those who have already adopted some
measures to implement the more expensive but cost-effective measure that are generally not
being adopted yet.”
The UCH is also supported by the consumer discount rate literature which suggests that
consumer discount rates are “too high.” Estimates range from 3 percent to over 100 percent, with
the most common results in the range of 20-35%.
2 Hausman (1979), Meier and Whittier (1983),
and others have concluded that high implicit consumer discount rates, may explain low levels of
energy saving investments. Meir and Whittier estimate discount rates for purchases of
refrigerators and found that 60 percent of those sampled had discount rates above 35 percent and
40 percent of those sampled had discount rates over 60 percent. Three estimates of discount rates
for investments in household insulation (thermal integrity of dwelling) are: 32% for shell
insulation from Arthur D. Little, (1984), 10-21% (depending on heating fuel) from Corum and
O’Neal (1982) and 26% from Cole and Fuller, (1980). These high hurdle rates are often used to
argue that households are ill-informed, lending support to the belief that a policy of government
funded education could lead to a more “optimal” level of investment. However, it is also possible
that the high discount rates simply reflect true, fully-informed structural parameters.
Metcalf and Hassett (1999) explore another hypothesis, namely that typical “real-world”
returns are less than those predicted in engineering studies. They find that realized returns to one
type of conservation, attic insulation, are only about one-fifth of the theoretically predicted
returns.
It has long been recognized that individual discount rates vary across households and, to
the extent that demographic variables help predict a household’s discount rate, they are likely to
play an important role in a household’s decision to insulate. At least fourteen studies show that
                                                       
2 For a full discussion of consumer discount rates related to energy efficient technologies see Train (1985).6
income and discount rates are inversely related.
3 Other work suggests that discount rates rise
with age (ADL, 1984 and Cole and Fuller, 1980).
III. The Uninformed Consumer Hypothesis
An individual will invest in a home improvement if the present value (PV) of benefits
exceeds the costs of the investment. For investments in household conservation, the present
value of benefits is equal to the discounted savings in future energy expenditures
PV = G Ct/(1 + *)
t. (1)
where Ct  is the savings in period t, and * is the discount rate applied to future income. The net
present value is simply the initial negative cash flow (cost of investment), C0, plus the present
value of future cash flows:
NPV = - C0 + G Ct/(1 + *)
t. (2)
Actual future savings are unobservable but can be proxied for by variables that affect the
magnitude of savings such as weather, size of the house, and fuel prices. Assuming that
individuals will invest if the net present value of a project is positive and will not invest if the net
present value is negative, then we can model the decision to invest (assuming the discount rate is
a fixed constant) as a binary choice model depending only on factors that are correlated with the
economic returns to home improvement:
I = 1  if  C0 < G Ct/(1 + *)
t
I = 0  if  C0 > G Ct/(1 + *)
t. (3)
Relating the future savings to the observable set of variables that proxy for savings gives:
I = c + $ 1 X  + , (4)
where  I is a dummy variable representing the addition of insulation, c and $ 1 are unknown
parameters and X is a vector of variables that affect the economic return to the investment. Such
                                                       
3 See Train (1985) for a list of citations.7
variables may be: house characteristics, fuel costs, weather, and number of children residing in
the house, as a proxy for time spent at home.
Because not all individuals share the same discount rate and given the large literature
relating income and age to consumer discount rates, we further extend the model to include the
vector Y, which contains variables related to age and income, as proxies for variation in one’s
discount rate:
I = c + $ 1 X  + $ 2 Y + , (5)
If the UCH is valid, then demographic variables such as education are appropriate to
include in modeling the decision to invest in insulation. Then the appropriate model would
actually be:
I = c + $ 1 X  + $ 2 Y + $ 3 Z + ,   (6)
where Z includes education variables that would, in the presence of X, and Y, help predict the
decision to purchase insulation, whereas according to a perfect markets hypothesis, each of the
elements of vector $3 equals zero because Z does not contain information which proxies for the
net benefit of insulation.
A test based on $3 should be fairly powerful.  First, if the age and income variables do not
fully describe the cross-sectional variation in discount rates, then education should be positively
correlated with the decision to invest, since education should be negatively correlated with
discount rates.  Conditional on the discount rate, however, home improvement activity that
requires a time commitment by the homeowner would be negatively correlated with education, if
more educated individuals have a higher value of time. On the other hand, the UCH requires that
people who have a higher probability of being informed – those who read magazines, for
example – should be more likely to invest. Since the opposing theories predict opposite signs for
$3, the test has the promise to be fairly informative.8
We proceed as follows: Since I is a discrete binary variable, assumed to be normally
distributed
4, a probit model is estimated for equation (4) to measure the coefficients and
significance of the economic variables presumed to model the decision to insulate. Next we
estimate equation (5) to see if income and age, as proxies for a discount rate, are significant. In
the next stage we include the Z vector of demographic variables in the model, compare the
results and observe the significance of these additional variables. Finally, we will perform a
Wald Test to test our hypothesis that the set of variables contained in the Z vector are equal to
zero.
IV. Data
The data we will use in our analysis is the Department of Energy’s Residential Energy
Consumption Survey (RECS) as constructed by Metcalf and Hassett (1999).
5 RECS is a national
survey performed by the DOE tri-annually. The data used in this paper are from the 1984, 1987
and 1990 surveys. Unlike data sets used in other research, the RECS data is national rather than
from a single state or metropolitan community. In addition to householders’ responses, there is
data on heating and cooling degree days so the possible effects of weather on investment
decisions can be accounted for. In addition, fuel costs are collected from suppliers rather than the
consumers, which is likely to be more accurate. Finally, because the survey is not part of a utility
company’s audit program, a self-selection bias is eliminated. All told, the data set provides as
complete a set of variables that predict economic returns as has been used in the literature.
Because of the broad scope of the RECS data set, we are able to observe nine different
types of energy saving investments. They are: attic insulation, basement insulation, wall
insulation, thermostat clock, hot water heater insulation, water pipes insulation, heating ducts
                                                       
4 Logit model regressions were also run with virtually identical results.
5 The entire RECS data set contains between five to six thousand observations per year. Metcalf and Hassett dropped
observations that did not have complete billing data available. This includes households with main heating fuel other9
insulation, caulking, and weather stripping. The data set constructed by Metcalf and Hassett
(1999) consists of 2272 observations with each household being observed twice (either in 1984
and 1987 or in 1987 and 1990). Thus, there are 1136 unique households in the original data set.
We further restrict the data set to include only single family homes. This constraint was
stipulated because other types of housing structures may not have the option of adding certain
types of insulation. For example, an owner of a third floor condominium may not have any attic
or basement space to insulate. Furthermore, because of neighbors on the same floor, the number
of outside walls may be reduced. (Thereby reducing the probability that wall insulation is added.)
Finally, certain hot water or heating facilities may be centralized to the entire building and any
individual owner may be unable to insulate that piece of equipment.
This leaves 1026 households that were surveyed in 1984 and 1987 and 864 households
that were surveyed in 1987 and 1990 for a total of 1890 observations from 945 households. All
households in the data set are home owners. Renters have been excluded for two reasons: First,
tenants may be less likely to invest in their rented property because of a greater uncertainty in
their length of residence there and their lack of ability to recapture their investment through
increased property value. Second, demographic variables may be measured for tenants while
investment decisions are made by the landlords thereby distorting results.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data set and the percent of households
undertaking different types of insulation investments. The two most common types of insulation
to add are caulking (19.6%) and weather stripping (16.6%). These are also the cheapest types of
insulation and also may significantly increase comfort levels (i.e. reduced draft) as well as
energy efficiency. 25.9 percent of households added one and/or the other during at least one
observation period. 13.0 percent of households added insulation to either their attic, walls, or
                                                                                                                                                                                  
than electricity or natural gas. For a complete discussion of the construction of the data, see Metcalf and Hassett
(1999).10
basement with attic being the most popular of the three (8%) and basement insulation being the
least popular (3.6%). Finally, 10.8 percent of households added insulation to their water heater,
pipes and/or heating or cooling ducts.
The variables in the data set which will be applied to our model in the vectors X, Y, and
Z are as follows: The vector X consists of the following variables: five dummy variables
representing the decade in which the house was built (a sixth dummy, built prior to 1940 is
excluded), the size of the house (measured in thousands of square feet) and a dummy variable
indicating if the house has air-conditioning, the price of the main heating energy (two variables,
one for the price of natural gas and one for the price of electricity are used depending on the type
of main heating fuel), data on heating degree days (HDD) and the number of children living in
the house as a proxy for time spent at home.
6 The Y vector includes the age of the head of the
household, age squared, and six income dummies with the top income variable being excluded.
The income variables are as follows: inc10, less than $10,000; inc10, less than $10,000; inc20,
$10,000 to $20,000; inc30, $20,000 to $30,000; inc40, $30,000 to $40,000; inc50, $40,000 to
$50,000; inc75, $50,000 to $75,000.
7 Any concern of a non-linear income effect should be
alleviated by use of income catagories.
The Z vector is constructed in two different ways and both approaches are tested. First,
the Z vector consists of dummy variables for the education level of the head of household
represented as follows: some college; completed college; and post-graduate work. A dummy for
high-school education or less is omitted.  The second approach is to use a variable for the
number of years of schooling completed and the number of years of schooling squared.
                                                       
6 Recognizing that a larger family is both more likely to be at home than a single person and more energy will be
consumed as front doors and refrigerator doors are opened and closed, the number of children should be positively
correlated with time spent at home.
7 Energy Information Administration (DOE) (1989) reports that underreporting of income may be a problem in the
RECS data set as determined by a comparison of income levels report in RECS and the Current Population Survey
by the Bureau of the Census.11
V. Results
In this section, in an effort to make our results comparable to past work, we first present
tables of the mean values and t-test results of the three category “add-insulation” dummy
variables over various demographic classes as well as a general dummy for the addition of any
insulation. In the second part of our analysis, the formal statistical tests are performed.
A. Stylized Facts
Our first approach is to try to identify which households are most likely to add insulation
to their homes by measuring the mean of each of the grouped insulation investment dummies
from table 1 according to a number of types of classifications. We look at the means for different
income levels and family sizes, age of the head of household and finally education level. The
mean of the insulation variables are comparable to the probability of investment for that group.
Table 2 presents the results grouped by general type of investment as well as a dummy
for any insulation investment. Rather than addressing the significance of each individual value,
we will address some of the trends that these tables indicate.
Income appears to positively affect the likelihood of investment in energy conservation
methods. Generally, as income increases, the probability of investment increases. This is less
pronounced in the grouped insulation dummies than in the dummy for any type of insulation
with the probability of adding attic, wall, or basement insulation virtually unaffected by income.
The results from analysis of the age of insulaters indicates that younger people are more likely to
add insulation than older people, with people under the age of 35 having noticeably higher
probabilities of investing than other age groups. In addition, households with 3 or more people
insulate significantly more than households with 1 or 2 people.12
Although not reported in table 2, our initial results also indicate that whites insulate more
than non-whites (0.430 for any insulation for whites verses 0.358 for non-whites), and married
people insulate more than non-married people (0.46 for any insulation for married households
verses 0.32 for single households). Furthermore, users of gas are more likely to insulate than
users of electric heat and households residing in older homes are more likely to insulate than
those residing in newer homes.
From the results on adding insulation based on educational attainment, it can be observed
that as educational levels rise there is a general increase in the likelihood of investment.
However, those with the highest levels of education are slightly less likely to insulate, while both
the decision to add weather stripping or caulking seem rather unaffected by education.  Clearly,
allowing for a nonlinear relationship between education and investment may be important.
In each of these tables, we report t-statistics for the test that the mean of the insulation
variable within a demographic variable differs significantly from the mean in the full sample.
Based on the pattern of t-statistics, our primary results indicate that income, education, and
family size are all predictors of a household’s decision to insulate their home. This is true when
looking at the pooled variables as well as the general variable for any additional insulation.
These conclusions are similar to those found in Hirst, Goeltz, and Carney (1981) and suggest
vailidity of the UCH.
B. Regression Results
Regression of Economic Variables
Having shown that simple analysis confirms results found elsewhere in the literature, we
now employ regression anlysis to test the UCH. The first regressions measure the impact of our
variables on the decision to add any insulation. For robustness, we also run regressions for the
three categories of variables (attic, basement or wall insulation; water heater, pipes or duct13
insulation; and caulking or weather stripping) recognizing that cost, rate of return, type of benefit
(i.e. increased efficiency, less draft), and labor intensity of installation may vary across
categories but may be homogeneous within categories. Category variables are used instead of
individual insulation variables because the degree of variation among many of the individual
insulation types is very low. The characteristics of each insulation type are very similar within
each group with respect to cost, scale, type of benefit, etc., so it is fair to assume that the decision
to make one investment is very similar to the decision to make another type of investment within
the same category.
The first column of Table 3 presents the point estimates and t-values for the variables in
equation (4). This is done to measure the accuracy of our economic variables so that we will later
be able to measure any change in their values by the inclusion of education variables. Most of the
variables are significant with the correct signs: people are more likely to insulate if they have
larger houses, live in colder climates, face higher energy prices, or live in older houses.
Recognizing the correlation between income, age, and consumer’s discount rate, the
second column replicates equation (5) but also includes income and age variables. The sign on
the coefficients indicate that households with annual incomes less than $30,000 are less likely to
insulate relative to households with incomes above $75,000, but households with incomes
between $30,000 and $75,000 are slightly more likely to insulate. However, all of the
coefficients are insignificant (t-values are all less than 1.0 for the general insulation variable).
These results may indicate either some liquidity constraint for low income families or a high
value of time for wealthy families, or both.
The third column in table 3 includes three education dummy variables necessary for
testing the UCH. The sign on the education coefficients are all negative and only the variable for
college education is significant. These results do not support the UCH suggesting rather that14
households with less education are actually more likely to insulate than households with post-
college education. A joint linear hypothesis test that all three education variables equal zero can
not be rejected (significance level is 0.23 by the Wald Test).
Tables 4, 5 and 6 repeat the results for regressions where the dependent variable is one of
the category insulation variables described earlier. Results are similar although the significance
of certain economic variables are sometimes weaker in these tables, for example heating degree
days is insignificant in table 5. This is not terribly surprising since one would not expect outdoor
temperatures to affect the decision to insulate, for example, a hot water heater. Age variables are
particularly insignificant in tables 5 and 6 as well. For the category insulation dummies the Wald
Test of the joint linear hypothesis of educational variables yields even larger p-values.
VI. Conclusions
The initial analysis of comparing the probability of adding insulation across numerous
groups suggests that a household’s decision to invest in energy conservation projects is affected
by many demographic variables. These results support the idea that households who chose to
insulate are markedly different than those who do not chose to insulate. However, regression
analysis on nearly one thousand households shows that education, a proxy for the probability of
being informed about potential cost savings from insulation, has either no effect on a
household’s decision to invest, or a significant negative effect, depending on the particular type
of insulation studied. Variables that help proxy for the economic return to investment, such as
heating degree days, the price of fuel and the age of the house, do affect a household’s decision.
Those who believe that households generally are uninformed in their decisions to invest in
insulation would expect less educated people would be less likely to do so. Our results reject that
claim.15
What factors determine if a household will insulate their home? Our evidence suggests
that the decision is likely based on an individual household’s expected returns from insulation.
(For further support of this proposition, see Metcalf and Hassett 1999.) There is no evidence that
benefits either to households or our economy at large will be realized by government programs
educating households on the returns of insulation.16
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Table 1. Summary of Insulation Variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Individual insulation variables
Add attic insulation 1890 0.080 0.271
Add basement insulation 1458 0.036 0.187
Add a clock thermostat 1890 0.061 0.240
Add wall insulation 1890 0.060 0.238
Add water heater insulation 1458 0.070 0.255
Add ducts insulation 1458 0.029 0.169
Add pipes insulation 1458 0.042 0.200
Add caulking 1458 0.196 0.397
Add weather stripping 1458 0.166 0.372
Group insulation variables
Add attic, basement and/or walls 1890 0.130 0.337
Add water heater, ducts and/or pipes 1458 0.108 0.311
Add caulking and/or weather stripping 1458 0.259 0.438
Add any insulation 1537 0.422 0.494
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RECS data.19
Table 2. Probability of Insulation Investment by Demographic Characteristic
Any type of Attic, wall or Pipes, ducts, or weather stripping
insulation basement hot water heater or caulking
High School Mean 0.413 0.127 0.094 0.264
Std. Dev. 0.493 0.333 0.293 0.441
t-test 0.817 0.426 1.869 -0.563
Some College Mean 0.431 0.129 0.127 0.270
Std. Dev. 0.496 0.336 0.334 0.445
t-test -0.350 0.069 -1.184 -0.530
College Degree Mean 0.456 0.161 0.118 0.250
Std. Dev. 0.499 0.368 0.323 0.434
t-test -1.074 -1.563 -0.459 0.301
Post College Mean 0.410 0.109 0.131 0.216
Std. Dev. 0.493 0.312 0.338 0.413
t-test 0.348 0.949 -0.940 1.280
Less than $10,000 Mean 0.321 0.137 0.083 0.210
Std. Dev. 0.468 0.344 0.276 0.408
t-test 3.210 -0.335 1.264 1.723
$10,000 - $19,999 Mean 0.367 0.114 0.096 0.241
Std. Dev. 0.483 0.318 0.295 0.429
t-test 2.121 1.061 0.759 0.744
$20,000 - $29,999 Mean 0.401 0.103 0.081 0.292
Std. Dev. 0.491 0.305 0.274 0.455
t-test 0.801 1.626 1.596 -1.372
$30,000 - $39,999 Mean 0.472 0.129 0.144 0.280
Std. Dev. 0.500 0.335 0.352 0.450
t-test -1.890 0.091 -2.088 -0.911
$40,000 - $49,999 Mean 0.500 0.157 0.137 0.327
Std. Dev. 0.502 0.364 0.345 0.471
t-test -2.120 -1.167 -1.215 -2.039
$50,000 - $74,999 Mean 0.478 0.159 0.112 0.244
Std. Dev. 0.501 0.366 0.316 0.430
t-test -1.818 -1.536 -0.190 0.517
$75,000 + Mean 0.471 0.139 0.127 0.155
Std. Dev. 0.502 0.347 0.335 0.364
t-test -0.928 -0.278 -0.511 2.04720
Table 2. Probability of Insulation Investment by Demographic Characteristic (con’t)
Any type of Attic, wall or Pipes, ducts, or weather stripping
insulation Basement hot water heater or caulking
Less than 25 Mean 0.500 0.286 0.280 0.360
Std. Dev. 0.510 0.460 0.458 0.490
t-test -0.809 -2.467 -2.790 -1.168
25-34 Mean 0.496 0.178 0.130 0.368
Std. Dev. 0.501 0.383 0.337 0.483
t-test -2.678 -2.717 -1.242 -4.382
35-44 Mean 0.452 0.141 0.110 0.271
Std. Dev. 0.498 0.348 0.313 0.445
t-test -1.235 -0.716 -0.084 -0.561
45-54 Mean 0.443 0.147 0.090 0.266
Std. Dev. 0.498 0.354 0.287 0.443
t-test -0.720 -0.934 0.977 -0.286
55-64 Mean 0.401 0.126 0.095 0.229
Std. Dev. 0.491 0.332 0.293 0.421
t-test 0.829 0.278 0.818 1.239
65+ Mean 0.342 0.077 0.102 0.182
Std. Dev. 0.475 0.267 0.303 0.387
t-test 3.637 4.128 0.434 3.838
1 person family Mean 0.354 0.108 0.102 0.205
Std. Dev. 0.479 0.311 0.304 0.404
t-test 2.453 1.372 0.325 2.099
2 person family Mean 0.418 0.103 0.122 0.244
Std. Dev. 0.494 0.304 0.328 0.430
t-test 0.275 2.674 -1.266 0.971
3 person family Mean 0.420 0.147 0.096 0.287
Std. Dev. 0.495 0.355 0.295 0.453
t-test 0.072 -0.959 0.714 -1.124
4 person family Mean 0.455 0.155 0.114 0.293
Std. Dev. 0.499 0.363 0.319 0.456
t-test -1.231 -1.471 -0.328 -1.399
5+ person family Mean 0.489 0.193 0.084 0.287
Std. Dev. 0.501 0.396 0.278 0.454
t-test -1.896 -2.909 1.084 -0.905
Note: t-test is a paired two-sample test that the difference of the two means equals zero. Results
are reported as the t statistic that the mean does not equal zero.21
Table 3. Probit Results
Dependent Variable: Any additional insulation











































































































No. Obs. 1537 1537 1537
Psuedo R
2 0.047 0.062 0.064
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The line labeled Wald Test reports the p-value from a joint
test that the coefficient on the three education variables all equal zero.22
Table 4. Probit Results
Dependent Variable: Attic, Basement or Wall Insulation











































































































No. Obs. 1890 1890 1890
Psuedo R2 0.066 0.030 0.054
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The line labeled Wald Test reports the p-value from a
joint test that the coefficient on the three education variables all equal zero.23
Table 5. Probit Results
Dependent Variable: Pipes, Ducts or Hot Water Heater













































































































No. Obs. 1458 1458 1458
Psuedo R2 0.012 0.026 0.027
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The line labeled Wald Test reports the p-value from a joint
test that the coefficient on the three education variables all equal zero.24
Table 6. Probit Results
Dependent Variable: Weather stripping or Caulking











































































































No. Obs. 1458 1458 1458
Psuedo R2 0.0432 0.0610 0.0635
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The line labeled Wald Test reports the p-value from a joint
test that the coefficient on the three education variables all equal zero.TUFTS UNIVERSITY 
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